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THE A CEIOAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [
Procedures for Controlling Unilateral Treaty Terminations
The absence of institutionalized procedures for resolving disputes about
continuing treaty regimes has produced a number of practical problems
for international lawyers. A treaty is a formalized reciprocally beneficial
commitment to collaborative behavior, which is undertaken in a factual
context.' If the factual context changes radically, the shared benefits
of the treaty may shift and continued performance of its original terms
may impose a severe deprivation on one party. When these circum-
stances arise, the deprived party lodges a claim to amend or terminate the
treaty. It is at this point that the absence of procedures for dispute-
resolution is sharply felt and the entire institution of treaties in inter-
national law is perceived as threatened. One consequence of this situation
is the marked reluctance to acknowledge the right of unilateral emenda-
tion or termination; the entire institution of clausula rebus sic stantibus
is by no means universally accepted 2 But, in a changing world, a rigid
doctrine of pacta suwl servanda itself impedes treaty-making and stable
international relationships; its rigor deters responsible states from the
broadest international agreements. Where treaty networks are threatened,
a state wishing to protect itself must necessarily resort to more coercive
strategies whose use can jeopardize general public order.
The International Law Commission's draft Convention on the Law of
Treaties,3 which was reviewed by the Vienna Conference, has encountered
the problem of dispute-resolution in exacerbated form. Due to the
strong diplomatic pressure from certain quarters, the prescriptions for
invalidating, terminating and suspending the operation of treaties have
been spelled out in greater detail than usual.4 As a consequence, the
need for establishing procedures for dispute-resolution has become ever
more urgent. Articles 62 and 63 1 of the draft introduce only the most
' The International Law Commission's draft defines a treaty in Article 2 (1) (a)
as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and gov-
erned by international law, -whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation." For other definitions in
usage, see McNair, The Law of Treaties 1-34 (1961); 1 O'Connell, International Law
211, 264 (1965).
2 For pertinent survey and evaluation of traditional sources, see Note: "Revolutions,
Treaties, and State Succession," 76 Yale Law J. 1669 (1967). For a detailed ap-
praisal of the Vienna Conference's approach to circumstantial change, see Schwelb,
"Fundamental Change of Circumstances," 29 Zeitschrift fiir Ausldndisches Offent-
liches Recht u. V6ikerrecht 39 (1969).
s United Nations, Reports of the International Law Commission, General Assembly,
21st Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9 (A/6309/Rev. 1) at 10 (1966); 61 A.S.I.L.
263 (1967).
4 See Arts. 43 to 68, Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1, at 16-19 and commentary, ibid. at 69-94.
5 Art. 62, setting out procedures to be followed in cases of invalidity, termination,
withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty, requires notifieation to
other parties of the intended measures as well as the reasons adduced for them. If,
within three months, there is no objection by the other party or parties, the claimant
may proceed to carry out its intended measure. If an objection is lodged within this
three-month period, the parties must resort to the modalities set out in Art. 83 of the
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minimal procedures: notification and, in case of disagreement, reference
to the modalities spelled out in Article 33 of the Charter.6 An alternative
approach, Article 62 bis, establishes a series of compulsory sequential pro-
cedures, most of them institutionalized, which alone will authorize invali-
dation, termination or suspension of operation.7
Past state practice suggests that compulsory procedures will either be
rejected by the Conference or, if accepted, be subjected to unilateral
reservations at the later stage of ratification. As a result, treaty-making
states will be required to devise their own procedures for dealing with
the increased problem of invalidity, termination and suspension in a
rapidly changing international context. Presumably the jurisdictional
clause usage will continue." Its perfection will be more urgent.
The chief weakness of a jurisdictional clause is that it cannot assure
initial constitution of the tribunal adverted to in the specific treaty.9
The jurisdictional clause itself is a reference to arbitration, and general
arbitral law and procedure provide for the replenishment and/or opera-
Charter (see note 6 below). The notifications mentioned in Art. 62 must, according
to Art. 63, be by written instruments with an indication of the full powers of the
signatory if he does not fall in the category of officials deemed, under international
law, to have fall powers as set out in Art. 6 of the draft.
6Charter Art. 33 (1) provides: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice." Draft Art. 62 refers only to the modalities of Charter
Art. 33; the renvoi does not include the peremptory obligation implied in the language
"the parties ... shall ... " This peremptory obligation would come into operation,
without reference to the draft convention on treaties, if the dispute were deemed by
the Security Council to constitute a "threat to the peace" within the meaning of Art.
39 of the Charter.
7 The text of Art. 62 bi8 was circulated at the United Nations Conference on the
Law of Treaties as A/Conf. 39/C.1/L.352/Rev.2, May 21, 1968; reprinted below, p.
690. It was apparently discussed at the recent Asian-African Consultative Committee
meeting in Karachi. An eloquent defense of the principles set out in Art. 62 Wi was
delivered by the observer for the American Society of International Law, Professor
McDougal; the text of his address is reprinted below, in the Documents section of this
JOURNAL, p. 685. To my mind, the chief operational weakness of Art. 62 bis is found
in the pivotal r6le assigned to the Secretary General. He is authorized to constitute
the arbitral tribunal if the parties themselves are unable to reach agreement. Pre-
sumably, he will not appoint a tribunal if he deems it politically unwise from the
perspective of his office's future activities. See, in this regard, the hesitations of the
Secretary General in the Peace Treaties case, [1950] I.C.3. Rep. 65, 221. Nor is the
President of the International Court of Justice, in a role as appointing authority,
immune from such political considerations. See [1952] I.0.J. Rep. 93 and [1952-53]
I.C.J. Yearbook 45.
8 For general survey, see United Nations, Systematic Survey of Treaties for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1948); Jenks, 47 Annuaire de l'Institut
de Droit International 54 (I).
9 See the Secretariat Commentary on the Draft Law of Treaties, A/CN.4/92 at 9-16,
26.
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tion of a tribunal from which one national member has defected.10 But
the operation of international arbitration law cannot come into effect
until an arbitral tribunal has been initially constituted.1' Because the
state which does not wish arbitration can avoid this obligation, the tribunal
may never be constituted and the jurisdictional clause will remain a
dead letter.
The.moment of formulation of a treaty between two parties represents
a comparatively high level of consensus; the moment of dispute, there-
after, represents a high point of dissensus. And the disagreement that
characterizes this latter point in time very obviously affects the willing-
ness of at least one party to submit itself to an institutionalized decision
process, which may in some way revise the substance of a treaty or a dis-
puted section of it. When a dispute arises over a bilateral treaty, one
party presumably demands a change in the treaty regime, whereas the
other finds that it is to its advantage in terms of long-range value interest
or short-range tactical position to stand upon a strict construction of
the treaty.
The optimum moment to prescribe dispute-resolving procedures is
clearly the moment of treaty formulation, the high point of agreement.
Thus, the question of insertion of a jurisdictional clause into the body
of the treaty is best introduced during this sequence. But unless the
jurisdictional clause is directed at a standing tribunal, such as the Inter-
national Court of Justice, the clause may not avail in a high-level dispute.
The party which wishes continuation of the treaty as it has been can
frustrate the formation of an arbitral tribunal simply by insisting that
there is no legitimate dispute and then refusing to appoint its national
member to the tribunal. As long as the arbitral tribunal has not been
constituted in plenary, there is no means by which the party seeking
arbitration can turn to some third party and secure initial arbitral con-
stitution. In the Peace Treaties cases,' 2 the International Court held, as
a matter of general international law, that an authorized external agent
could replenish a tribunal only after that tribunal had been initially
constituted. 8  The International Law Commission sought to remedy this
defect, in its proposed Convention on Arbitral Procedure, by peremptory
integration of the International Court in all arbitral regimes. The
Court was to be authorized to appoint an arbitrator in lieu of a national
member in order to complete the constitution of the tribunal, and, there-
after, to reappoint a panelist if a national member should defect from a
functioning tribunal. 4  The I.L.C. draft was not acceptable to the Mem-
ber States of the United Nations.
10 See Reisman, "Revision of the South West Africa Cases," 7 Va. T. Int. Law 1,
31-32 (1966) and references there. But of. De Visscher, "Reflections on the Present
Prospects of International Adjudication," 50 A.J.I.T. 467 (1956).
17 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, [1950]
I.C.J. Rep. 65, 221; 44 A.J.I.L. 742, 752 (1950).
2 Ibid. is [1950] I.C.31. Rep. at 229.
1 See note 9 above; for text of IL.C. draft, see 53 A.J.I.L. 239 at 241 (1959).
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One way of avoiding at least this problem is to render the constitution
of the arbitral tribunal envisaged in the jurisdictional clause as a com-
ponent of and necessary condition for the entry into force of the treaty
in question. The tribunal could be formed, declare itself in session,
register the existence and operation of the treaty and then adjourn sine die.
Once in existence, the tribunal cannot be disrupted by the defection of
one state. Should a dispute arise and one state remove its panel member,
general arbitration law authorizes the tribunal itself to replenish its per-
sonnel and, after following the proper default procedure, to render award.
One cannot quantify the political effect of such an ex parte award or,
for that matter, even of an award rendered after real joinder by both
parties. On the other hand, it is clear that even an ex parte award is
more of an authority asset in subsequent negotiation than no award at all.
This factor in itself may induce joint submission to arbitration rather than
resort to coercive reprisals for alleged breach of treaty obligations. At
the same time the integration of continuous arbitration in a treaty regime
may render the latter more flexible and, through time and changing cir-
cumstances, more responsive to the genuine shared objectives of the parties.
W. M. RusmAN
United Nations Seminar in International Law for Latin America
In pursuance of the United Nations Program of Assistance in the Teach-
ing, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law
set up by the General Assembly,1 the United Nations Institute for Training
and Research (UNITAR) undertook to conduct annually a series of re-
gional seminars and training and refresher courses in international law to
be held in rotation in Latin America, Asia and Africa. While refresher
courses are designed to offer training to junior government officials and
young teachers and research students 2 the aim of seminars is to provide a
forum for senior officials and scholars to discuss international legal prob-
lems of particular interest to the region concerned.
The first regional seminar in international law was held in Quito, Ecua-
dor, from January 13 to 24, 1969.3 A number of international organiza-
tions co-operated with UNITAR at various stages in the planning and
preparation of the seminar, including UNESCO, the Organization of Ameri-
can States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the Inter-American Development Bank. UNITAR also received the
advice of an Advisory Panel of jurists and diplomats from the region.
The basic objective of the seminar, in accordance with the resolutions of
the General Assembly, was to foster the r6le of international law as a means
1 See General Assembly Res. 2099 (XX), 2204 (XXI), 2313 (XXII) and 2464
(XXIII). See also 60 A.J.I.L. 342, 526, 664 (1966).
2The first regional refresher course had taken place in Dar-es-Salaam from Aug. 14
to Sept. 7, 1967. See note by Herbert Briggs in 62 A.J.I.L. 454-456 (1968).
a The Government of Ecuador offered host facilities at the Central University of
Ecuador for the sessions of the seminar.
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